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The first of commentators of Thomas Aquinas did come from the 
Netherlands. Master Henry of Gorkum, a small town in the Netherlands 
between Utrecht and Rotterdam, accomplished his studies in Paris, and 
made a considerable career in Cologne. Henry transposed what he took 
to be the central theological insights of Thomas into a literary form that 
was fit for educating students. What are these insights? In summarizing 
the Summa Theologiae and in writing a tract called De divinis nominibus, 
how did Henry introduce his students to the work of what he deemed 
the most important theologian since Augustine? This contribution offers 
an answer to these questions, and it proposes a number of insights of 
Henry because of which it is still worthwhile in our days to study his 
writings. 
 First we will dwell a bit on the importance of names and naming for 
Aquinas. Next we will introduce Henry of Gorkum. Sections 3-5 are 
devoted to the study of Henry’s interpretation of Aquinas, mostly on the 
basis of his De divinis nominibus. 2  In concluding we will summarize our 
findings. 
 
1. Aquinas on naming the divine 
 
“And I shall give them in my house and within my walls a place and a 
name better than sons and daughters; I shall give them an everlasting 
name that will never be effaced”, says the Lord (Isa 56.5). This prophecy 
occasions Thomas Aquinas to briefly outline a possible sermon (collatio it 
is called by some3) on the names of the faithful and the Name itself. 
Aquinas’ notes are divided on two subjects: the names of the faithful, and 
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the love for the Name of God. The faithful receive their name from 
predestination: “The Lord called me when I was in the womb, before my 
birth he had pronounced my name” (Isa 49,1). They are called children of 
God since God has adopted them: “You must see what great love the 
Father has lavished on us by letting us be called God’s children - which is 
what we are!” (1Jo 3,1). The name is given by grace: “You have a name 
and hold firmly to my name” (cf. Rev 2,13), and is a token of the renewal 
of the mind: to those “I will give a white stone, with a new name written 
on it” (Rev 2,17). The shorthand that Aquinas here employs, leaves 
ample space for interpretation. Names constitute one’s identity, an 
identity in this case dominated by primordial calling that corresponds to 
eschatological destination, revolving around adoption and grace. Such is 
the identity of the faithful, which ranges from ‘beginning’ to ‘end’, and 
lives from Christ’s work of salvation. Their spiritual life of being called 
upon, expresses itself in love for the Name; the Name that includes 
Christ the Saviour: the Name is great and arouses fear, as the Lord says 
that “My Name is great among the nations” (Mal 1,11). The Name is holy 
and incites veneration: “He has done great things for me, holy is his 
name” (Lk 1,49). The Name is delightful and calls for meditation: “Thy 
Name and thy memory is what my soul longs for” (Isa 26,13, Nomen 
tuum et memoriale tuum in desiderio animae). The Name is abundant in 
compassion: “Thy Name is an oil poured out” (Sg 1,2, Oleum effusum 
nomen tuum). The Name is powerful to invoke: “the Father will give you 
anything you ask him in my name” (Jn 15, 16). The Name is uniquely 
capable of salvation: “There is no other name under heaven in which we 
can be saved” (Acts 4,12). Lastly the Name is hidden for knowledge: 
“What is his Name, and what is the name of his Son, do you know?” (Pr 
30,4).  
 These seven aspects of the Name are telling. First of all because the 
Name includes Jesus Christ. Aquinas makes no distinction here between 
names of God and names of Christ. On the contrary, he comes close to 
saying that ‘Jesus’ is the name of God, quoting from Peter’s homily in 
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Acts. The fact that the aspects are seven will not be coincidental: the 
names of God and Christ are innumerous, and the reason for this is 
intimated by the last one mentioned: the hiddenness of the name of God 
and the name of the Son. Most divine names, Scriptural as they are, are 
taken from creaturely perfections, all of which preexist in God in an 
eminent way; no creaturely representation, be it real or be it mental in 
those who attempt to understand, will be adequate. For this, Scripture 
takes its refuge to a plurality, a multitude of names, of translations of the 
Name.  
 These few words, written by a still youthful Thomas Aquinas, 
probably in Cologne, may come as a surprise to some, who are not 
accustomed to the more spiritual aspect of Aquinas’ work. In fact, I 
would like to defend, and have done so elsewhere4, that the theological 
attitude that this little scheme betrays, is fundamental for Aquinas. 
Aquinas’ theological authorship is characterized by a profound interest 
in language and naming the divine; the naming of Christ is an essential 
part of this interest, which is animated by Aquinas’ permanent drive to 
both show and respect God’s hiddenness in Christ, to such an extent that 
his christology may be called ‘negative’. Some have welcomed this 
interpretation, whereas others have expressed doubts5: would Aquinas 
have recognized it? We don’t know, but what we are about to learn is 
what the first commentator of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, living in 
Cologne as well, some 170 years later thought of it. It will turn out that 
the oldest of commentators considers the topic of the divine names to be 
in the heart of Aquinas’ theological authorship, entailing two other 
highly relevant insights. The first insight concerns the relationship 
between the sermo de Deo and the sermo de Christo, the second Aquinas’ 
‘negative’ approach in both respects. 
 
3. A few biographical notes on Henry of Gorkum 
 
Henry must have been born in 1377 or 1378 in Gorkum (Gorinchem), at 
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the time belonging to the Utrecht diocese. The exact date is unknown and 
postulated by Weiler, because of his licentiate in the arts in Paris, dated 
on 1398. Henry was to study the arts, consequently act as Magister artium 
between 1398 and 1402, and to be a student of theology. There are no 
records left of a Parisian licentiate in theology, but he must have obtained 
one, since he was able to receive licentiate and doctorate in Cologne only 
shortly after his moving there in 1419. In 1410 he had resumed teaching 
the arts in Paris, but he left the city, which was in turmoil due to wars, 
famine and the plague, for a relatively quiet Cologne. Being a secular 
priest, Henry served as parish priest there, and being a well-respected 
scholar, he was professor in theology at the university. Next to this, 
Henry was famous for founding a gymnasium, a bursa, for young 
students, to provide for a good preparation for enroling in the arts, and 
at the same time to provide for an opportunity to further the cause of a 
renewed Thomism. For that was the cause with which Henry came from 
Paris, since 1407 dedicated once more to realism instead of nominalism, 
to Cologne, where the original nominalism from the early beginnings of 
the university had not survived either. The conflicts concerning the via 
antiqua and the via modernorum seem to be first and foremost conflicts 
concerning the way in which learning should be organized: by studying 
and explaining the works of Aristotle or by a new method that is less 
concerned with commenting authoritative texts and more with a modus 
quaestionis and a terminist treatment of logical issues: study of the parva 
logicalia (in Cologne: supposition, ampliation, appellation, obligations, 
insolubles and consequences) and analysis of scientific demonstration. 
Cologne in fact had found a compromise, but the via antiqua was 
dominant. Attempting to avoid the condemned theological consequences 
of nominalism, and possibly faithful to the views of the Parisian 
chancellor Jean Gerson, Henry put himself to providing education with a 
large number of writings the paramount purpose of which must have 
been didactic in nature: logical works, philosophical works and most of 
all theological works. Among the latter a Lectura super Evangelium, a 
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compendium of the Summa Theologiae entitled Quaestiones in S. Thomam, 
Conclusiones super IV Libros Sententiarum, an adaptation of the 
Supplementum IIIae Partis Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, a 
number of treatises among which treatises on the divine names, 
predestination and the eucharist, and a treatise against the Hussites. In 
historical respect it is rather important that Grabman and Weiler credit 
Henry to be the first commentator of the Summa Theologiae, to be the first 
to put Aquinas in a central place in his teaching, about a century before 
Paris would do so and cause Spanish Thomism to flourish.6 The 
thomistarum coloniensum monarcha, as he was called by one of his students, 
seems to have been well-respected, a scholar with a clear mind, engaged 
in putting before his students the essentials of philosophical and 
theological learning, without undue sophistry, idle speculation or 
craving for polemics; an irenic and practical man, always willing to solve 
problems or intervene in academic or political matters; moreover 
someone who never sought originality or personal prestige. This we will 
shortly encounter. 
 
2. The prologues of Henry’s De Divinis Nominibus 
 
The Name of God is delightful and calls for meditation, Aquinas said. He 
corroborates this point by quoting a passage from Isaiah 26 that is rather 
classic in works or questions that deal with the subject of naming the 
divine: “Nomen tuum et memoriale tuum in desiderio anime”: “Thy Name 
and thy memory is what my soul longs for”. It is this very quotation that 
is chosen by Henry of Gorkum to act as the thread of his exposition of the 
divine names. In the general prologue he adds that it is the sweetness of 
the divine love, consuming his inner self, which causes the prophet to 
‘throw up’ this word. Interiority and exteriority is one of the classical 
themes Henry touches upon, in quoting Isaiah and alluding to the 
Aristotelian conception that exterior words express the interior concept 
flowing forth from an understanding of the external ‘thing’ to be 
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understood. The soul, acting in this way, is in a certain sense everything, 
Aristotle is quoted saying (De Anima III). Therefore, Henry says, 
whenever the soul forms a name of God in the hiddenness of the mind, it 
gives room to God himself. For this reason each devout person will say: 
Thy name and thy memory is what my soul longs for (f 1r). 
 However, all names, exterior as well as interior, are deficient, since 
God is ever greater than all human knowledge of him, which is 
corroborated by evidence from Aristotle and the Book of Causes. Both 
divine excellence and weakness of human understanding cause the 
inadequacy and the plurality of divine names. For novices in theology 
and others to speak more easily and confidently about God without fault, 
Henry collects insights concerning the divine names in a handbook of 
study. He says so having quoted Jerome from Aquinas’ works: “since 
from words spoken disorderly heresy flows forth”, adding “therefore, 
whenever we speak of the divine, we should act cautiously and 
modestly”.7  
 Henry’s concern is with his students, and in line of this with the 
public character of theology, of speech about God. The exteriority of 
spoken words about God is not to be reduced to the interiority of prayer, 
even though the former bespeaks the latter, but has a value of its own. 
For one thing, because it may give rise to error and doubt. It is also quite 
clear that de divinis nominibus is best interpreted as concerning not only 
divine names, but all speech about God. The context in Aquinas from 
which Henry quotes Jerome, is about Arianism and Sabellianism, where 
Aquinas proposes avoiding speaking about e.g. diversity and difference 
in matters Trinitarian, lest one comes too close to Arianism. The contents 
of Henry’s treatise confirms this interpretation of nomina as well. It is 
subdivided in three parts, the first of which covers the contents of ST I, 13 
(de nominibus Dei), the second the theology of the Trinity, and the third 
the theology of Christ. Henry intends to proceed by propositions 
formulated on the basis of authentic sayings and rules, subjoining their 
causes and expositions. The first part “qualiter lingua theologica debeat 
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enunciare de divinis nomina ad unitatem essentie seu divine nature pertinentia” 
(f. 5r) consists of 10 propositions, the second “de nominibus quibus utimur 
loquentes de his quae concernunt distinctionem ad intra in divinis” (f. 5r) 16 
propositions, and the third “nomina quibus utimur loquentes de deo ratione 
nature assumpte” (f. 13r) 13 propositions. The rules that Henry mentions 
are most interesting. Some of them will be examined later on, but in 
general one has to concede that their formulation stems from a practice of 
teaching in which a certain kind of theology has become dominant and is 
translated for the needs of students: the theology of Thomas Aquinas. To 
this we will return shortly. 
 The same spirit that animated the general prologue is to be 
recognized in the prologues to the second and third part of the treatise. 
The prologue to the second part once again quotes from Isa 26, but now a 
distinction is made which is famous for the controversy it bred: the 
distinction between natural knowledge of God, and inspired 
knowledge.8  Thus, Aquinas’ primary distinction between “things 
pertaining to the divine essence” (ST I, qq. 2-26) and “things pertaining to 
the distinguished persons” (qq. 27-43), which is an objective distinction, 
is interpreted against the background of the content of q. 32 on the 
(human) knowledge of the divine persons. Here Aquinas distinguishes 
between that which can be known on the basis of natural reason (ratio 
naturalis) and that which is known only by faith and ‘proven’ only by 
adducing auctoritates. Knowledge of God based on knowledge of 
creatures, cannot attain knowledge of the distinction between the divine 
persons, since the divine persons have the power of creation in common. 
The combination of theo-logical, literally taken, and epistemological 
considerations that Henry undertakes, is clearly one step further than 
what Aquinas intended, and prepares for the eventual distinction of two 
separate treatises de Deo uno and de Deo trino in neo-thomist manuals of 
theology.9 
 With a touch of poetry Henry continues the prologue in likening 
the trinitarian divine names to drops of water that enable one to perceive 
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the divine torrent of sweetness. For this reason no one will regret having 
spent some time studying the names that the Holy Fathers employed 
when dealing with the three persons of the Holy Trinity. And therefore 
some propositions are given for this longing of this soul. Notice the order 
that Henry describes: the propositions are formulated in order to 
facilitate the study of the divine names, which in their turn make God’s 
overflowing sweetness approachable, thus serving the longing of each 
human soul.  
 The largest of prologues, finally, is the one to introduce the third 
and last distinctio concerning the names that we employ when speaking 
about God ratione naturae assumpte, i.e. Christ Incarnate. Needless to say, 
once again the quotation from Isaiah 26 is prominent; this time it is 
quoted as many as five times. Without any hesitation Henry equates the 
name of God with the name of Christ he deems most fundamental: Jesus. 
Once again, as he did in the first prologue when selecting a topic 
concerning language in divinis from somewhere in the middle of the 
treatise on the divine persons, he dives into the middle of Aquinas’ sermo 
de Deo Salvatore (ST III pr.), i.e. question 37,2: Utrum convenienter fuerit 
Christo nomen impositum, to come to the fore with a number of insights 
regarding the name Jesus. The procedure to abbreviate Aquinas Henry 
chooses is interesting: first he quotes the biblical authority from the 
argument sed contra (imposition of the name Jesus), second he mentions 
the Aristotelian axiom with which Aquinas opens his determination, 
without, however, quoting Aristotle in full. Next he skips the part in 
which Aquinas shows how in ordinary naming of proper names those 
names some way or other are taken from a property of the one named 
(f.i. the child receives the name of the saint on whose feast day it was 
born, or from its father, or from an event or a certain quality), and 
addresses directly those names that are imposed by God. Those names 
always signify a divine gift bestowed upon the one named: Abraham, 
Peter. Such is the case with Jesus as well, since Christ human was gifted 
with the office of grace to save all human beings.10 Independently from 
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Aquinas Henry continues by adducing sayings from Anselm, Augustine 
(?), Ambrose and Bernard of Clairvaux. Ambrose excepted, these sayings 
are prayers addressed to Christ the Saviour, which fits in neatly with the 
quotation from Isaiah. Anselm and Augustine confess the predominance 
of the name Saviour, Jesus, among the names of Christ. Ambrose lists a 
number of names of Christ that all pertain to his salvific work: medicus, 
fons, virtus, vita, lux, alimentum. Bernard glorifies Christ as the source of 
sources of all virtue and knowledge, naming Christ’s work with many 
different names. But all the names that are attributed to Christ, and now 
Henry returns to ST III, 37,2 (ad 1), in some way signify the name Jesus, 
f.i. Emmanuel signifies the cause of salvation, i.e. the union of divine and 
human nature in the person of the Son by which He has become God 
with us.11 The eucharistic names of Christ are explicitly mentioned, and 
finally Henry concludes by quoting the letter to the Philippians (2,10): in 
the name of Jesus every knee will bend etc. What our soul longs for is 
thus especially the name of its saviour, of Jesus, this name that the Song 
of Songs (1,2) calls “an oil poured out”. 
 The prologue is not ended, however, since Henry once again, as at 
the end of the prologue to the second distinction, gives an indication for 
the right interpretation of what he is up to. Adressing Jesus the Saviour 
directly, he states that the incarnation has brought us many names and a 
philosophy which is worthy of admiration and unheard of by 
philosophers of old. It is for the benefit of the study of those names, that 
in this third part of the work propositions are formulated which deal 
with the art of enunciating faithfully the language of the incarnation.12 
 
From the contents of these prologues it may confidently be concluded 
that the christological part of this treatise on naming the divine 
constitutes its climax. In this respect Henry shows himself to be a faithful 
student of Aquinas, whom he never bothers to mention, but silently 
quotes. According to Henry there is an evident linkage between Aquinas’ 
treatise on divine names, on the divine persons and on God the saviour, 
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since all of them revolve around language in divinis: its inadequacy, its 
truth, its rules and its spirituality.  
 
4. Henry’s interpretation of Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 
 
It takes some effort to discover the principles for Henry’s organisation of 
the material of  I, 13, Aquinas’ major treatment of  naming the divine in 
general. At first sight it looks like he has thrown it all in the air and has 
represented it in the way it had come down. But appeareances deceive. 
Henry’s didactic purpose has appreciated the students’ predilection for 
concrete names. Therefore he starts out, in the first three propositions (2, 
3, and 4) with three, in fact five, different kinds of names:  
 a) stone, rock, lion, lamb, grapevine, and the like 
 b) lord, creator, cause, saviour, and the like 
  (knowledge, foreknowledge, predestination, providence and 
the like) 
 c) to be, to live, to know, to understand; to be good, wise, just, 
true, free; to be active, to be immaterial, and the like 
  (to be eternal, to be independent, to be omnipotent, to be pure 
act, to be first cause, and the like) 
The first are identified as metaphors and temporal names which are 
predicated improperly of God, the second signify relations ex tempore (or 
ab aeterno) but are said truly and properly, whereas the third and most 
important type of names are considered to be the divine attributes, which 
Anselm called predicata perfectionalia (different from names said cum 
excessu perfectionis, as to be eternal etc.). 
 The next three propositions (5, 6, 7) consider different aspects from 
what Henry calls the divine attributes: they signify God substantially but 
imperfectly and analogously, they are not synonyms even though they 
stand for God’s simplicity, and their multiplicity is not only due to the 
naming subject but has a ground in the one named even though the one 
named is one.13 The following propositions (8, 9) are once again devoted 
 11 
to particular names: 
 d) God, He who is 
 e) light (lux, lumen), splendor, and the like 
 And the last proposition (10) sums up a number of rules for speech. 
Henry’s principle of organisation can thus be detected: different kinds of 
particular divine names. To the material of q. 13 he silently adds (prop. 9) 
a category that Aquinas only later in the Prima Pars (67.1) discusses: 
names that fit God metaphorically but, due to extended signification, 
nevertheless properly (light, splendor). 
 In the course of his commentary (o.c. pp. 141-145), Weiler is able to 
identify material from all of the first eleven articles of question 13. He 
fails to mention article 12 that apart from some rather vague remarks in 
proposition 10, seems to be missing. The reason for this is simple, but 
telling. Article 12 concerns the question whether affirmative propositions 
may be formed about God. Aquinas’ main tool in composing an 
affirmative answer, is the distinction between signification secundum rem, 
and signification secundum rationem, i.e. between supposition 
(denotation) and signification (connotation). Whether we say homo est 
albus (accidental predication), or homo est animal (substantial predication), 
or homo est homo (identical predication), in all cases a real identity is 
affirmed between that which is denoted by the subject-term, and 
connoted by the predicate-term. The fact that the proposition is 
composed of several terms is due to our mode of understanding and 
signification, but does not eo ipso imply a real composition in the subject 
about which the proposition is formed. Therefore no violation of God’s 
simplicity is committed. In the course of his determination Aquinas 
employs the rule that predicate-terms are to be interpreted formally, and 
subject-terms materially. This is the same distinction between 
signification and supposition formulated in different words: predicates 
signify or connote the form, whereas subject-terms supposit or stand for 
(denote) the existing thing. The distinction between supposition and 
signification can be omitted by Henry in his first part, since it is the basic 
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insight underlying all analysis of christological language. In other words, 
economically as he must be in this short treatise, Henry must have 
thought: I will shortly come to those matters when discussing 
christological language. And indeed, he does so. For in christologicis a 
clear distinction between supposit or person and natures, between the 
interpretation of the subject-term and the predicate-term, between 
supposition and signification is fundamental. For this reason, Henry 
selects Aquinas’ questions on whether Christ is a compositum, on the 
communicatio idiomatum, and on the being of Christ. We will resume this 
subject in our next section. 
 There is yet another instance which shows the grounds why Henry 
associates the contents of q. 13 with the sermo de Christo. At the end of his 
commentary on the third proposition (f. 2r), concerning proper temporal 
relational names, he mentions two examples from christological 
language. Both of them can be found in Aquinas as well, but in the Tertia 
Pars. Having explained the mixed relations that exist between God and 
creation, Henry applies this to the name ‘Son of Mary’ of Christ (there is 
no real relation to his mother in the Son, but Christ is nevertheless really 
the son of Mary), and to the hypostatic union in general (the Word 
begins to be human, is really human, without any alteration on Its part).14 
Since the hypostatic union implies a relation between the Word of God 
and human nature, the names for Christ imply this relation. Such a 
relation can be of no other kind than the relation which is implied by 
other relational names, such as Creator or Lord. Therefore names for 
Christ incarnate imply a relation which is on the side of the divine a 
relatio rationis tantum, and on the side of the created human nature a 
relatio realis: a mixed relation.15 
 From this we may conclude that Henry is well aware of the 
christological relevance of the general treatise of the divine names: in 
respect of the distinction between supposition and signification as well as 
in respect of the classification of names for Christ incarnate among the 
relational temporal names. 
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 The last aspect of the first distinctio that I would like to draw 
attention to, is its persistent stress on the inadequacy of the human 
modes of signification and God’s supereminence. In general we already 
encountered this in the first prologue to De divinis nominibus. But now 
Henry is able to specify the ways in which existent language fails to 
represent God as He is. Metaphorical names include imperfection in their 
very meaning, such as materiality and temporality (prop. 2). Some names 
signify an excess of perfection itself, such as to be eternal or to be 
omnipotent, implying that there is also an incomprehensible excess of 
meaning (prop. 4). Other names, the attributes, are to be interpreted as 
implying such an incomprehensible excess of meaning, since they signify 
creaturely perfections that God possesses in an eminent way, and are 
said of God not univocally or equivocally but analogously (prop. 5). 
Moreover, God cannot be thought to actually possess the attributes 
signified by the corresponding names, since God is absolutely simple; but 
our mode of understanding and our mode of signification is built on 
composite being, and therefore in its structure fails to represent the 
divine as it is (prop. 6). At the end of the first distinctio Henry formulates 
four rules, that he alternately calls regula, documentum, and canon, all of 
which are pertinent in this respect. (1) To be distinguished are that from 
which a name is derived, and that to which a name is imposed. Divine 
names are derived from perfections that proceed from God, which 
imperfectly represent Him, but they do not purport to signify that 
process (God is living, meaning: from God proceeds life), but God 
inasmuch the perfections preexist in an eminent way in Him. This rule 
functions in several places in Aquinas’ treatise: to reject one opinion on 
how divine names would not signify God substantially (Alain de Lille, cf. 
13.2 c.), to distinguish several meanings of Deus, and to locate the priority 
of analogical names in their application to the divine over their 
deduction from or imposition to creatures (a.o. 13. 6). (2) Human 
knowledge and naming of the divine is derived from knowledge and 
naming of material creatures. Material creatures are composed; in none 
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of them form and subsistence are identical, as in God. Therefore we use 
both concrete (signifying substance) and abstract (signifying form, 
simplicity) nouns in naming the divine (cf. 13.1 ad 2). (3) Imperfection 
inheres all names that we employ to name the divine. They are, as 
Gregory says, stammering resonances of divine perfections.16 Material 
creatures from which we derive knowledge and names of the divine are 
very deficient representations of the divine, unable as they are to 
represent the divine perfection as it is in itself, and human modes of 
understanding are imperfect, since they cannot understand but through 
looking into phantasms. Nevertheless, propositions about God, such as 
God is wisdom and God is wise, are regarded to be true, even though 
their modes of signification are unfit for the divine, implying 
accidentality and having properties (cf. 13.1 ad 3; 13.12). (4) Finally 
Henry mentions the threefold way of knowing and naming God as laid 
out by Pseudo-Dionysius: the via causalitatis, the via eminentiae, and the 
via remotionis.17 The latter, the way of removal, removes from God, Henry 
says, all imperfection that human knowing or naming, apt as it primarily 
is for created reality, implies. Therefore God is said to be pure act, 
incorporeal, immaterial, simple, indivisible, etc. (f. 5r) 
 
5. Henry’s interpretation of Summa Theologiae III 
 
As we have seen above, Henry takes his vantage point considering the 
sermo de Christo not from the beginning of the Tertia Pars, but from q. 37: 
the name Jesus. His prologue to the tertia distinctio explains how 
meaningful and fundamental this name is, signifying Christ’s salvific 
presence. For a moment, possible disengagement of his scholasticism 
gives way to the proper context of naming the divine, the context of 
prayer. 
 In the course of his treatment of christological language, Henry 
unfolds thirteen propositions, in all respects according to the order of the 
Tertia Pars.18 The first proposition could be translated as: “A sound 
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foreknowledge of the mode of union of the Word Incarnate is the most 
favourable proem for rightly speaking about the divine incarnation”.19 
Nothing could better hit the heart of the matter. The twofold stress on the 
fact that knowledge of the mode of the union precedes the rest is telling. 
Henry considers questions 2-15 as presuppositions for christological 
language. For that is the part which Aquinas subsumes under “de modo 
unionis Verbi Incarnati” (III 2 pr.). Questions 16-26 are “de his quae 
consequuntur unionem” (III 16 pr.), and one expects Henry to count these 
as belonging to the “favourable proem” as well. As a result one has to 
notice that all propositions Henry formulates belong to this area.20 
Consequently, everything that follows has to be regarded as a 
prolegomenon, a proem to actual christological language. This is quite 
important to note, since otherwise one might be tempted to discard this 
kind of reflection on account of its lack of historical or soteriological 
interest: it does not intend to do that job nor suggest that it should not be 
done at all, it just considers it fruitful to formulate a proem so that the 
conditions of possibility of “loquendi recte de divina incarnatione” will be 
fulfilled. How important that is for Henry is the subject of the first lines, 
where he says that from such knowledge all ability depends to discern 
between language fitting or unfitting for the mystery of the incarnation.21 
One should note the use of sermones convenientes et disconvenientes. Henry 
ends his treatment, saying that a smart reader will be able, on the basis of 
this material, to judge which christological language to prefer.22 At the 
end of the third prologue he talked about propositions “containing the 
art of enunciating faithfully the language (sermo) emerging because of the 
incarnation”.23  Well now, the expression sermones must be taken literally. 
Henry is engaged in explaining and interpreting the very wording of 
fundamental sound propositions concerning Christ.24 In the first 
proposition it is explained how the mode of the union should be 
understood, and the other propositions indicate what kind of words and 
propositions fit that mode. Would the mode be otherwise, other 
locutions would be needed.25 ‘Union’ and ‘assumption’, and their 
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different forms, are key words in christology, but they possess a highly 
different semantics. What can be said with the one, cannot be said with 
the other and vice versa. For instance, the one who unites can be said to 
be the one united, whereas the one who assumes cannot be said to be the 
one assumed; it can truly be said that human nature is united to divine 
nature or that divine nature is united to human nature, but to say that 
divine nature is assumed by human nature is not correct. Thus a number 
of semantic differences are brought to the fore, entailing a different 
Truth/False analysis of certain propositions. Such is Henry’s linguistic 
interpretation of ST III, 3, contained in his second proposition. Easy to be 
done, he says, for someone who has the right conception of the mode of 
the hypostatic union. The same linguistic reading is undertaken 
concerning the subject of ST III, 4 on ‘that which is assumed’ in the 
hypostatic union. In proposition 4 he does so by analyzing the terms 
‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘carnal body’ and ‘soul’ when employed in the 
expression ‘Filius Dei assumpsit ...’. Propositions 4 - 12 all regard the truth 
or falsehood of a large number of exon Christ pressions. Propositions 4 
and 5 do so rather implicitly, but at the end of his treatment of 5 Henry 
says that on the basis of a sound knowledge of the hypostatic union it 
will not be difficult to understand and formulate enunciations about 
Christ which are rather unusual for other human beings.26 This time his 
students themselves must apply the principles to language. The next 
propositions, however, are all devoted to certain expressions, the most 
important of which is proposition 6, Henry’s interpretation of ST III, 16: 
If one applies to the holy incarnate union some rules that are common in 
the sciences, it will be easy to speak justly in the communication of 
property-terms, the proposition says.27 In the course of his treatment, 
Henry identifies six rules of a semantic nature, the application of which 
facilitates the analysis of propositions about Christ. The first two of these 
are most important, since they lay out the principles of supposition and 
signification. They are literally taken from ST III, 16, 1. The first concerns 
the logical status of the subject-term [e.g. this tree is x], and the second of 
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the predicate-term [e.g. x is a tree]. The first could be paraphrased as: 
‘Every concrete name with connotation, can denote something which 
belongs to the class connoted’.28 The second as: ‘Of everything that 
belongs to a certain nature a predicate-term may truly and properly be 
said which concretely connotes that nature’.29 The distinction of these 
two main modes of signification already animated the very reflection on 
the mode of the union, since there a distinction was made between 
supposit or person, the object of supposition, and natures, the object of 
signification. But now the linguistic reading is developed in full, 
interpreting “Deus est homo” and “Homo est Deus”. On grounds of the 
second rule mentioned, the predicate-term homo can truthfully be said of 
Deus, since the predicate-term connotes a nature by which the supposit of 
Deus exists, even though Deus does not signify or connote that (human) 
nature.30 The truth of Homo est Deus depends on both rules: the subject-
term is taken to stand for the supposit of both human and divine nature, 
the latter of which is signified by the predicate-term. Thus the 
constitution of the linguistic rule of the communicatio idiomatum is laid 
out. For it is on the basis of the truth of both propositions mentioned, 
together with the rules of supposition and signification, that it can be said 
that (the Son of) God was passible, was mortal and is temporal, or that 
this man is impassible, immortal and eternal. Having outlined the 
communication of property-terms, Henry for the first and only time in 
this treatise, except for the prologues, employs a prayerful and vocative 
style. It indicates the awe and mystery that he encounters.31   
 The remaining part of the sixth proposition employs both the 
distinction between material and formal interpretation of terms (see 
above) and the theory of reduplication: the repetition in a proposition of 
the nature signified by the subject-term, f.i. Christus secundum quod homo 
est creatura. 
 The last feature of Henry’s third distinction that I would like to 
draw attention to is his treatment of the being, the esse of Christ. The 
decisive point of view is taken in the first few lines, that are not easily 
 18 
accessible. Christ must be called one and not two, and He has also only 
one being. Even though divine nature is predicated abstractly of the 
divine supposit which is signified concretely (i.e. Filius Dei est divina 
natura), still human nature is not. For it cannot be said that Christ is 
humanity. Therefore, Henry says, is Christ one and not more (f. 17 r.). 
From a correct understanding of how one should speak about Christ 
incarnate an interpretation is deduced of his being. In other words: a 
proper interpretation of est x yields a proper interpretation of esse. It is 
true to say Filius Dei est divina natura and to say Filius Dei est Deus. Such a 
view entails that there is only one divine being, outside of which nothing 
can be called divine: the doctrine of divine simplicity. It is also true to say 
Filius Dei est homo, but Filius Dei est humana natura or humanitas is false, 
since there are also others of whom it is said that they are human. Being 
two could only apply to Christ according to the natures, but these 
natures cannot abstractly be predicated. They are predicated concretely 
(est Deus, est homo), signifying the natures as they are in a supposit. Of 
such a supposit there is only one in Christ, and therefore Christ cannot be 
called two, and needs his being be one as well. The rule is, Henry says, 
that one thing has only one absolute being. It is therefore impossible to 
multiply the personal or hypostatic being as such. The problem that 
arises concerning a human being that would accompany a fully human 
nature in Christ, is tackled in the way Aquinas did (cf. ST III, 17,2): the 
being that goes with the human nature is on the one hand not an 
accidental being, since it would fail to make Christ really human; on the 
other hand it is not a completely new human personal being, since it 
would fail to make Christ one; instead it is thought of as a new habit, a 
new relation, that connects the preexistent personal being with the 
human nature. It follows that that person now can be said to exist in a 
human nature, be human as well.32 
 Considering Henry’s presentation of Aquinas’ first part of his sermo 
de Christo, on the conditions of possibility of actual speech about Christ, it 
may be concluded that in no respect whatsoever Henry innovates or 
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even improves Aquinas. On the contrary, he stays very close to his hero. 
The interesting part of his explanation, however, is the way in which he 
brings out clearly the logical and linguistic underpinnings of Aquinas’ 
treatment. 
 
6. By way of conclusion: christological regulation 
 
It may have struck the reader that there is a considerable difference in 
genre and style between the prologues and the propositions of De Divinis 
Nominibus. The first are meditative, prayerful and addressed, almost 
mystical in nature. The second are argumentative, didactic and rather 
detached. Another difference between these two types of texts, closely 
related to the ones mentioned, is evident as well: when explaining his 
propositions, Henry almost never quotes from Scripture. It is my 
interpretation that the rules that he frequently formulates, substitute for 
quoting from Scripture. The rules, although both philosophical and 
theological in nature, supplant analysis of concrete use of language in 
Scripture for didactic purposes. For the same reason almost no Fathers or 
other authorities are quoted. This crucial aspect of Henry’s treatise 
contributes once again to its preliminary character, i.e. preliminary to the 
actual sermo de Christo of theology. The application of the rules remains 
confined within the limits of the explanation of the contents of the 
propositions, which in themselves bear a preliminary character. 
 
Let me return to the first section of this contribution. I mentioned three 
reasons for which it is worthwhile to study Henry of Gorkum’s treatise 
on the divine names. Henry considers the topic of the divine names to be 
in the heart of Aquinas’ theological authorship. This is important both in 
historical and systematic respect. The oldest of known commentators 
guides us in interpreting the work of Aquinas. Moreover, for Henry it is 
evident that Aquinas’ more general analysis of divine names applies to 
Christ as well. In this respect Henry renders explicit what the Summa 
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Theologiae leaves only implicit. While Aquinas’ (and Henry’s) sermo de 
Christo is devoted solely to names that are attributed to Christ incarnate, 
supposing prior treatment of names for the Eternal Son in the course of 
trinitarian theology, the main emphasis is on (composed) propositions of 
which ST III 16 and 17 are the best examples. But Henry shows 
excellently why Aquinas can say that qq. 16 and 17 flow forth from a 
prior understanding of the mode of the hypostatic union: the latter works 
with a distinction between signification and supposition which guide the 
explicit analysis of propositions in qq. 16 and 17. This entails a third and 
last point of interest of Henry’s treatise. If Aquinas’ general treatise on 
divine names applies to the sermo de Christo as well, then this goes for the 
negative, apophatic character of Aquinas’ general treatise as well. Once 
again it makes explicit what in the ST III remains implicit, and for which 
one has to adduce e.g. Aquinas’ commentary on Isaiah, as was done 
above, where he quotes Proverbs (30.4): “What is His name, and what is 
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